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AI is the answer. Sorry — what was the question?

Most AI programmes fail long before the technology does — at the point where nobody wrote down the business problem. Five questions to ask before the money moves.

A question mark chalked on a board

There is a particular meeting that happens in mid-market businesses about twice a year now.

Someone senior has been to a conference, or read a competitor’s press release, or had a demo that genuinely was impressive. They arrive with a proposition: we need to be doing something with AI.

Nobody in the room disagrees, because disagreeing sounds like being left behind. A budget line appears. A vendor shortlist appears. Six months later there is a pilot, a dashboard, a modest efficiency claim nobody can trace to the P&L — and a growing suspicion that a lot of money has been spent answering a question nobody ever asked.

The technology is not the failure point. The failure point is upstream of it, at the moment the answer was chosen before the problem was written down.

41%

of UK businesses using AI have a clear idea of what success looks like

95%

of enterprise GenAI pilots show no measurable P&L impact

40%

of agentic AI projects forecast to be cancelled by end-2027

Adoption is near-universal. Definition of the problem being solved is not.

The evidence for this is now embarrassing

Only 41% of UK businesses using AI have a clear idea of what success looks like, according to Studio Graphene’s 2026 research — and less than a third report positive ROI on their investment. Those two numbers are the same finding stated twice.

MIT’s Project NANDA reported in July 2025 that roughly 95% of enterprise generative AI pilots showed no measurable P&L impact, against $30–40bn of spend. The study is preliminary and not peer-reviewed, and the headline figure deserves scepticism. Its diagnosis is the useful part: it points at integration and organisational learning, not model performance.

Gartner’s June 2025 forecast — more than 40% of agentic AI projects cancelled by the end of 2027 — attributes cancellations to escalating costs, unclear business value and inadequate risk controls. Not model quality. Not capability.

And in DSIT’s UK adoption research, the single most-cited barrier among businesses not adopting AI is lack of an identified need, at 71%. That is usually quoted as evidence of a failure of imagination. Read it the other way and it is the most honest finding in the dataset: a large share of British businesses have looked at AI, failed to locate a problem it solves for them, and declined to spend. Some of those are missing an opportunity. Some of them are simply further ahead in the reasoning than the organisations already three vendors deep.

The tell is in how the paper is written

You can diagnose this from a single page. Look at how the initiative is described in the board pack.

“We need an AI strategy” is one kind of sentence. “Quote turnaround is 11 days against a 4-day market norm, and we are losing bids on speed” is another. So is the gap between “deploy agents in customer service” and “first-contact resolution is 62%, and the other 38% generates three repeat contacts each.”

“We need an AI strategy.”
“Quote turnaround is 11 days against a 4-day market norm, and we’re losing bids on speed.”
“Deploy agents in customer service.”
“First-contact resolution is 62% — the other 38% generates three repeat contacts each.”

The right-hand column can be measured, budgeted and cancelled. The left-hand column cannot.

The second version in each pair can be measured, budgeted, defended and — crucially — cancelled. The first cannot. A programme framed as “doing AI” has no failure condition, which sounds like a comfortable place to be until you realise it also has no success condition.

This is not a semantic point. It is the difference between an investment and an act of faith with an invoice attached.

Two organisations that learned this in public

Klarna

Klarna is the reference case, and it is instructive precisely because the technology worked.

In February 2024, Klarna announced its OpenAI-powered assistant was handling work equivalent to 700 full-time customer service agents. By May 2025, CEO Sebastian Siemiatkowski told Bloomberg the company had over-corrected — conceding that where cost dominates the evaluation, “what you end up having is lower quality.” Klarna reopened hiring for complex and premium-tier support.

Klarna did not reverse its AI strategy; it rebalanced it. The assistant stayed on the front line for high-volume, structured intents. But look at the question the programme had actually been asked: how much cost can we take out? That is a real question. It is just not the same question as what service are we trying to deliver, to whom, and where does a human have to be in it?

Answer the first without the second, and the second gets answered for you — retrospectively, by CSAT decline.

Commonwealth Bank of Australia

CBA made the sharper error, because the question was never even measured.

In July 2025, CBA made 45 direct banking roles redundant, citing a voice bot it said had cut call volumes by 2,000 a week. The Finance Sector Union disputed the figure, took the matter to the workplace relations tribunal, and reported that volumes were in fact rising — with overtime being offered and team leaders pulled onto phones. In August the bank reversed the redundancies, apologised, and acknowledged its assessment had not adequately considered all relevant business considerations.

CBA did not have a broken agent. It had a claimed benefit that had never been instrumented. Nobody had established what the demand actually was before removing the capacity to serve it.

Transpose that into a UK or EU context — consultation obligations, TUPE-adjacent exposure, and full EU AI Act enforcement from August 2026 — and the same error becomes materially more expensive.

Where the disciplines disagree — and they do

This is not a case where every function nods along.

Business / Strategy

Takes the hard line: name the process and the number that has to move. If neither can be stated, there is no programme, only a budget.

Technology

Pushes back, legitimately. You cannot fully specify a problem for a capability you have never felt. Some hands-on exploration genuinely has to come before the problem statement sharpens — and a firm that refuses to experiment until it has a perfect business case will experiment last.

Data & AI

Raises the more uncomfortable objection: a large share of what gets scoped as an AI problem is a data quality problem, a process problem, or a master data problem wearing a more fashionable label. Fix the underlying issue and the AI case frequently evaporates — which is exactly why nobody in the delivery chain is incentivised to ask.

Procurement

Points at the commercial consequence. Consumption-priced agent platforms have no natural ceiling, and if you have not defined the transaction, you cannot model the cost of one. Agentforce lists at around $2 per conversation; Copilot Studio at roughly $200 per 25,000 credits, with premium message types carrying five-to-thirty-times multipliers. (US list rates — UK and negotiated pricing will differ, but the shape of the exposure does not.) An undefined use case is an uncapped liability.

The reconciled view: Technology is right that exploration has to happen. But exploration and commitment are two different decisions, and the failure mode is welding them together — running a “pilot” that is really a platform selection in disguise, with a three-year agreement at the end of it.

Explore freely. Commit only against a written question.

Five questions that reconstruct the question

For any candidate initiative, before money moves.

  1. What is the decision?Name the transaction, not the function. “Customer service” is not a problem. A 38% repeat-contact rate is.
  2. What is it costing today?Instrumented, not estimated. If you cannot measure the baseline, you cannot prove the benefit — and you will find that out at the worst possible moment, as CBA did.
  3. What number has to move?One primary metric, with a target and a date. Everything else is a secondary effect.
  4. Why has it not been fixed already?The sharpest question, and the one most likely to be skipped. If process redesign, better data, or a policy change solves it, AI is the expensive answer to a cheap problem.
  5. Who is accountable when it is wrong?A named human, a working override route, and an explanation a regulator or an ombudsman would accept.

Answer those five and the technology decision more or less makes itself — often in favour of something duller and cheaper than the thing that was originally proposed. That is the point.

The commercial consequence

For businesses in the £50m–£1bn band, this is not an academic distinction. There is no innovation budget to absorb a written-off programme, and no Big Four retainer to socialise the blame when it fails. Every pound spent answering the wrong question is a pound not spent on the right one.

The organisations that will look intelligent in 2027 are not the ones that adopted earliest. They are the ones that could say, out loud and in advance, exactly which number they expected to move and by when — and were willing to be wrong about it.

AI may well be the answer. But you need to make sure you have the right question first.

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Sources

Studio Graphene UK business AI research, 2026 · MIT Project NANDA, The GenAI Divide: State of AI in Business 2025, July 2025 (preliminary, non-peer-reviewed) · Gartner, Gartner Predicts Over 40% of Agentic AI Projects Will Be Canceled by End of 2027, 25 June 2025 · DSIT AI adoption research, 2025 · Bloomberg and Reuters reporting on Klarna, February 2024 and May 2025 · Bloomberg, ABC and Finance Sector Union statements on Commonwealth Bank of Australia, July–August 2025 · Salesforce and Microsoft published US list pricing, 2026.